The book was recently recommended by Congressman and presidential candidate Ron Paul in a reading list to Rudy Giuliani on the topic of American foreign policy and the motivations for suicide terrorism. During a presidential candidates' debate in South Carolina on May 15, Giuliani stated he had never heard of Paul's explanation of the 9/11 attacks against America, and Paul decided a reading assignment was in order. As a ten-term Congressman and author of numerous books on monetary and foreign policy, and the most ardent defender of personal liberty and less-intrusive government, Paul's recommendations should carry great weight in the political arena. He often refers to history and analysis to back up his arguments, and has recommended Pape's Dying to Win several times during his campaign thus far.
Pape divides the book into three main sections, each of which examines a different logic of suicide terrorism. The book also contains extensive appendices, which present the data and analysis that Pape used in his studies.
In the first major part of the book, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," the author examines broadly why campaigns on suicide bombing are waged, and dispels some of the more conventional wisdom ("They hate us for our freedom," and so on). According to Pape, al-Qaeda, Hamas, the Tamil Tigers, and all organizations turn to suicide terrorism against democratic countries for three main reasons: because they wish to gain control of a territory but are weak in conventional weaponry, they believe that the public will of democracies are more easily swayed, and they have learned that suicide terrorism yields results.
Pape examines various campaigns of suicide terrorism and shows that these reasons are the ones most often cited by the various groups for the actions. Hamas wishes Israel to leave the occupied territories of Palestine, and thus targets Israelis, while al-Qaeda wishes to end US foreign occupation of the Arabian peninsula and other Muslim regions, and thus targets America. Even though al-Qaeda has targeted other nations, as well, their strategic motivation is to place greater military and economic burdens on the US and remove the support of allies. However, Pape argures that suicide terrorism has been largely unsuccessful at its broader goals of ending perceived occupations, and has achieved only smaller, more inconsequential concessions from their targets.
The second part of the book examines "The Social Logic of Suicide Terrorism," which discusses the community support of campaigns of suicide terrorism. Papes argument is that nationalism is a stronger motivational factor than any other, although organizations have also inflamed religious differences. When countries are faced with a foreign occupation, they are more likely to rally around their own sovereignty and oppose the occupation. When the occupying country is also of another major religion (Hindu Tamil Tigers and Buddhist Sri Lanka, Muslim al-Qaeda and Christian United States), terrorist organizations use the difference to inflame the nationalistic tendencies even further, creating a perceived threat to the homeland's chosen religion if the occupying force altered the national religion.
To support his argument in this section, the author tests his theory on the major suicide terrorist campaigns that have been waged around the world since 1980. In each of the cases, there was a stronger tendency towards this type of terrorism when a foreign democracy was occupying a homeland and that foreign nation had a religious difference. In fact, when religious difference was not present, the campaign of suicide terrorism was less sustained or aggressive. Perhaps the most enlightening part of this section looks at non-Muslim suicide terrorism to show that there is not an inherent aspect of Islam that encourages suicide as a terrorism tactic. In the case of the Hindu Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, Islam is not the major religion of either party, yet this group is responsible for more suicide terrorist attacks than any other.
The last section of the book discusses what would motivate a person to volunteer to give up his or her life in an attempt to kill as many others as possible. Pape argues in "The Individual Logic of Suicide Terrorism" that suicide terrorists are motivated by altruistic reasons more than any other, including a desire to improve the lives of the community and put an end to the foreign occupation. Pape differentiates between egoistic suicide, altruistic suicide, and fatalistic suicide, showing that most terrorists who willingly strap bombs to themselves or drive truck bombs into buildings fit most accurately into altruistic suicide. This is an important point, as it shows that terrorists desire to improve the lives of their families and community by ending the foreign occupation, rather than simply killing others of a different religion because of fundamental beliefs. Again, religious differences are used to make suicide acceptable as a tactic, but foreign occupation is the main motivational factor.
Pape also examines the demographic characteristics of suicide terrorists, which dispels the myth of the depressed, young male suicide bomber who has no job and no education. To the contrary, suicide terrorists are often "educated, socially integrated, and highly capable people who could be expected to have a good future." Suicide terrorists are also spread across very broad demographic lines, with some organizations (PKK in Turkey ) using nearly 70% female bombers, while others (al-Qaeda) prohibit females from becoming warriors at all. Many more terrorists are also middle income earners than unemployed or low income, and often more motivated by secular beliefs than fundamental religious beliefs.
Throughout the book, Pape stresses that it is foreign occupation that is the main motivational factor that encourages suicide terrorism. This aspect is also viewed in the light of current US foreign policy, which is attempting to spread Democracy in the Middle East through force of arms in an attempt to neutralize the effect of Islamic fundamentalism. Unfortunately, this strategy is the very one that causes suicide terrorism, as it is built on a foundation of foreign occupation of Muslim nations by a Christian American army. This is the reason for the increase in suicide terrorism against American targets since 2002-2003, and explains the emergence of the tactic against Americans in Iraq. Until the invasion of Iraq, there was not a single suicide terrorist attack in the country, but the number of bombings has risen from 20 in 2003 to 125 in 2005.
As a work of analysis on the tactic of suicide terrorism, Dying to Win presents a logically coherent argument that is backed up by the facts of each major campaign of suicide terrorism. The author provides an exhaustive account of the individual bombings of each campaign and tests his theory in the light of the characteristics of them. His conclusions that foreign occupation is more important than any other factor should give American politicians some pause, as the cause of, and solution to, al-Qaeda's campaign against the US becomes immediately apparent, even if victory is not easily achieved. Hopefully more politicians will become aware of Pape's analysis and encourage a more subtle, understanding policy towards the Middle East, rather than rely on simplistic concepts of Us vs. Them or Good vs. Evil to explain the threat of suicide terrorism to America. Policy-makers in Washington have a constitutional duty to protect the nation from threats against our national defense, and this book provides the basis for a strategy of victory against terrorism, instead of the doomed-to-failure policy now being enacted.